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Abstract
Many studies specify human mortality patterns parametrically,
with a parameter change aﬀecting mortality rates at diﬀerent ages
simultaneously. Motivated by the stylized fact that a mortality de-
cline aﬀects primarily younger people in the early phase of mortality
transition but mainly older people in the later phase, we study how
a mortality change at an arbitrary age aﬀects optimal retirement age.
Using the Volterra derivative for a functional, we show that mortal-
ity reductions at older ages delay retirement unambiguously, but that
mortality reductions at younger ages may lead to earlier retirement
due to a substantial increase in the individual’s expected lifetime hu-
man wealth.
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1 Introduction
In the twentieth century, people tended to retire earlier in most developed
countries, despite the fact that there was a steady and signiﬁcant increase in
life expectancy. In the US, for example, the life expectancy at birth for men
who were born in 1900 was about 50 years. This ﬁgure increased substantially
to over 70 years for those who were born in the middle of the century, and
increased further to almost 80 years for those born in the 1990s.1 Despite
increasing life expectancy, however, labor force participation rates of men
aged 65 and over steadily declined from over 60% in 1900 to around 20% at
the last decade of the century, while the rates of men aged 55 to 64 declined
from around 90% to below 70% for the same period (Costa [8, Fig. 2.1]).2
Various explanations have been proposed for this seeming paradox. For
example, the important role of the generous beneﬁts provided by the so-
cial security system has been analyzed by Gruber and Wise [10, 11], and
the wealth eﬀect associated with sustained economic growth has been exam-
ined by Costa [8]. To complement these well-known explanations, several
researchers (such as Bloom et al. [3], Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17]) examine
the relatively neglected question of how mortality decline aﬀects retirement
age. In particular, Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17] show that people may re-
tire earlier if the decrease in the variability of age at death associated with
mortality decline is very signiﬁcant. In this article, we continue this line of
inquiry by studying the diﬀerential incentives for early retirement provided
by mortality changes at diﬀerent stages of demographic transition.
A salient feature of mortality changes in many countries is that, while
life expectancy has increased steadily over the last two centuries, mortality
decline does not occur uniformly across age groups (Lee [18], Wilmoth and
Horiuchi [23], Cutler et al. [9]).3 In the earlier stage of mortality transition,
a decline in mortality pertains mainly to younger people, particularly infants
1The data, which are based on the life tables constructed by the Oﬃce of the Actuary
of the Social Security Administration, can be downloaded from the Berkeley Mortality
Database (http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/˜bmd/). Obviously, some ﬁgures for these
cohort life tables reﬂect projected mortality.
2Similar conclusions are also obtained for slightly diﬀerent age groups, countries and
time periods. For example, clear downward trends are observed in labor force participation
rates for men aged 60 to 64 in a larger set of developed countries (except perhaps Japan)
in the second half of the twentieth century (Gruber and Wise [11, Fig. 1]).
3Another feature of observed mortality decline, one that is emphasized by Kalemli-
Ozcan and Weil [17, p. 66], is that “as life expectancy has risen, uncertainty regarding the
date of death has fallen.” Both features have been mentioned in Wilmoth and Horiuchi
[23]. In Section 3 we will compare Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17] with this article, and link
their diﬀerences to these two features of mortality decline.
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and children, whereas in the later stage, an “aging of mortality decline” has
occurred, characterized by “successively larger reductions in mortality rates
at older ages, and by smaller reductions at younger ages” (Wilmoth and
Horiuchi [23, pp. 484-485]).4 An illustration of this pattern is given in Fig.
1, which is based on the survival data, starting from age 20, of diﬀerent
cohorts of men in the US. The upper panel shows the survival curves of
men born in four diﬀerent decades: the 1900s and 1910s at the beginning
of the century, and the 1980s and 1990s towards the end of the century. It
is observed that the improvement in survival probabilities at various ages is
more substantial for the earlier period. Moreover, unlike the later period,
the mortality decline at the beginning of the century pertained mainly to
younger people. This is seen more clearly in the lower panel of Fig. 1, in
which we plot the mortality rates (in log) at diﬀerent ages.5 The mortality
decline occurred in greater concentration among people aged 20 to 50 from
the 1900s to 1910s.
[Insert Fig. 1 here.]
Motivated by the stylized facts regarding the aging of mortality decline,
we study the eﬀect on optimal retirement age of a change in mortality at an
arbitrary age. To do so, we use a method diﬀerent from that of most existing
studies, which usually address the eﬀect of mortality decline by modeling
the human mortality pattern using a parametric approach and considering
the derivative of retirement age with respect to a change in the survival pa-
rameter. One characteristic of this approach is that a change in the survival
parameter usually aﬀects mortality rates at diﬀerent ages simultaneously.
For example, in an article examining whether an individual’s saving level or
retirement age adjusts more substantially when there is a mortality decline,
Bloom et al. [3] show in a model with age-invariant mortality rates (as in
Blanchard [2]) that the optimal response to a mortality decline is to delay
retirement, with zero (or possibly negative) eﬀect on saving rates. How-
ever, a change in the parameter of an age-invariant mortality process aﬀects
4A related and more formal term is “epidemiologic transition”, which refers to the
transition “in which degenerative and man-made diseases displace pandemics of infection
as the primary causes of morbidity and mortality.” (Omran [19, p. 510]). In this article,
we do not investigate the causes of mortality decline but rather take them as given, and
focus on the implications of the “aging of mortality decline” aspect of this transition.
5Note that age-speciﬁc mortality rate, μ (x), is related to the survival probability, l (x),
according to Eq. (1) below, or equivalently, μ (x) = − 1l(x) dl(x)dx . Note also that in Fig.
1 we plot the data up to age 110 (instead of 120 in the original data set), because the
mortality rates for men aged above 105 or so are based on an extremely small number of
observations.
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mortality rates at all ages to the same extent.6 Thus, although this widely
used speciﬁcation is helpful for analyzing some economic phenomena (such
as government debt policies), it is not appropriate if one’s objective is to
isolate the impact of mortality change at a particular age. In other paramet-
ric speciﬁcations of the survival curve (such as in Boucekkine et al. [6]), a
mortality parameter change does not go so far as to aﬀect mortality rates at
all ages to the same extent, but it still aﬀects mortality rates at diﬀerent ages
simultaneously. Thus, if there are systematic diﬀerences in how changes in
mortality at diﬀerent ages aﬀect the retirement age, the diﬀerences are not
clearly illuminated through these methods.
In this article, we consider a life-cycle model of consumption and retire-
ment choice with lifetime uncertainty, and characterize the optimal retire-
ment age and consumption path. We then investigate the eﬀect of a change
in age-speciﬁc mortality rate on the optimal retirement age. Since the op-
timal retirement age is a function of mortality rates that are themselves
dependent on age, the appropriate method to use is the derivative of a func-
tional. We use the Volterra derivative (Volterra [22], Ryder and Heal [20],
Bommier [5]) to show that, while a mortality decline among older people
unambiguously leads to a delay in retirement, a mortality decline among
young people may lead to earlier retirement. We provide economic intuition
of this systematic diﬀerence by decomposing the eﬀect of a mortality change
on retirement age into the “years-to-consume” and “lifetime human wealth”
eﬀects. (More detailed discussion of these eﬀects will be provided in Sec-
tion 3.) When a mortality decline occurs among an older age group, as in
the later phase of mortality transition, the increase in individuals’ expected
lifetime human wealth is usually negligible, and thus the years-to-consume
eﬀect dominates. On the other hand, when a mortality decline occurs among
a younger age group, as in the early phase of mortality transition, it turns
out that the increase in individuals’ expected lifetime human wealth can be
quite substantial, dominating the years-to-consume eﬀect.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Because the eﬀect
of mortality changes on retirement age is most clearly seen in a life-cycle
model in which perfect annuities are present and disutility of labor does not
depend on life expectancy, we begin by analyzing this basic model. In Sec-
tion 2, we use the model to examine consumption and retirement decisions,
and in Section 3, we consider the eﬀect of a mortality decline at an arbitrary
age on optimal retirement age. Section 4 extends the model to allow for
6The survival probability of an age-invariant mortality process is given by l (x) = e−αx,
where α is the instantaneous mortality rate at any age. Thus, a change in α aﬀects
mortality rates at all ages by the same extent.
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the dependence of disutility of labor on life expectancy to capture the “com-
pression of morbidity” hypothesis (as in Bloom et al. [3]) and to allow for
imperfect annuities. We demonstrate the robustness of the main results in
the basic model vis-a`-vis these diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Concluding remarks
are presented in Section 5.
2 The model
We consider a life-cycle model in which age is modeled as a continuous vari-
able between 0 and Ω (the maximum age).7 Lifetime uncertainty is captured
by a general speciﬁcation of the survival function l (x), where
l (x) = e−
∫ x
0
μ(q)dq (1)
is the survival probability at age x, l (0) = 1, l (Ω) = 0, and μ (q) ≥ 0 (with
limq→Ω μ (q) = ∞) is the instantaneous mortality rate at age q.
We make the convenient yet realistic assumptions that labor supply is
indivisible and retirement decision is irreversible. These assumptions follow
many articles such as Heijdra and Romp [15] and Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil
[17], and are consistent with the stylized description of retirement as “a
complete and permanent withdrawal from paid labor” in Costa [8, p. 6].
In this model, an individual chooses a consumption path and a retirement
age to maximize expected lifetime utility∫ Ω
0
e−ρxl (x)U (c (x)) dx−
∫ R
0
e−ρxl (x)φ (x) dx, (2)
subject to the law of motion
a′ (x) =
{
[r + μ (x)] a (x) + w (x)− c (x)
[r + μ (x)] a (x)− c (x)
if x ≤ R
if x > R
, (3)
and boundary conditions
a (0) = 0, a (Ω) ≥ 0, (4)
where R ∈ [0,Ω] is the retirement age, ρ is the discount rate, r is the constant
(real) interest rate, w (x) is the (real) wage income at age x if the individual
7As in many studies examining the relation between life expectancy and retirement
age, we abstract from the childhood stage of the human life cycle. Thus, age in our model
refers to adult age (which can be conveniently interpreted as actual age minus 20), unless
speciﬁed otherwise.
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is working, c (x) is consumption at age x, a (x) is ﬁnancial wealth at age x,
and φ (x) is disutility of labor at age x.
We assume that individuals have no bequest motive, and that annuities
are perfect (as in Yaari [24]). It is well known that in such an environment,
individuals will ﬁnd it optimal to purchase annuity contracts. As captured
in (3), an individual of age x will surrender ﬁnancial wealth a (x) to the
insurance company if death occurs, but will receive an extra amount equal
to μ (x) a (x) if death does not occur. We make the standard assumption
that marginal utility of consumption is positive and diminishing:
U ′ (c) > 0, U ′′ (c) < 0. (5)
We also assume that disutility of labor is non-negative and non-decreasing
in age:
φ (x) ≥ 0, φ′ (x) ≥ 0. (6)
The assumption φ′ (x) ≥ 0 has also been used in Hazan [13] and Heijdra and
Romp [15].
The various speciﬁcations of this model are guided by related studies and
the particular objectives of this article. We ﬁrst review several closely related
articles examining the eﬀect of mortality decline on retirement age, and or-
ganize their diﬀerences according to three aspects: survival function, annuity
market and objective function. As summarized in Table I, researchers use
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the survival curves, including rectangular, exponen-
tial, a two-parameter model suggested by Boucekkine et al. [6], and a general
speciﬁcation based on actual data. For the annuity market, it is assumed to
be perfect in most of these articles, but the alternative assumptions of an
absence of or an imperfect annuity market have also been used in Chang [7],
Heijdra and Mierau [14] and Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17]. For the objective
function, all of these articles assume time separability and no bequest mo-
tive, and all but one of these articles assume that the instantaneous objective
function is separable in consumption and labor (or leisure). Furthermore, a
general concave utility function of consumption, as well as special functional
forms ranging from linear, log and Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA),
have been used. For disutility of labor function, researchers make various
assumptions such as being independent of age, depending on age only, or
depending on age and life expectancy.
[Insert Table I here.]
Since our objective is to investigate the impact on retirement age of the
aging of mortality decline, we use a general non-parametric survival function
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to isolate the impact of mortality decline at an arbitrary age. We assume a
perfect annuity market for the following reasons. Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil
[17] focus on the decrease in the uncertainty about the age at death during
the mortality transition, and show that mortality decline may lead to earlier
retirement. Their suggested mechanism depends crucially on a lack of annu-
ities, since the eﬀect on retirement age of a decrease in the variability of age
at death is eliminated if perfect annuities exist, and other channels associated
with mortality decline lead to a delay in retirement (see the discussion in pp.
76-77 of their article). We make the opposite assumption of perfect annuity
market, such that the channel through the decrease in the variability of age
at death is shut down, and any possible eﬀect of mortality decline is purely
due to the aging of mortality decline.8
Following most researchers, we choose an objective function with time
separability as well as separability in consumption and labor. For the vari-
ous speciﬁcations about disutility of labor mentioned in Table I, we obtain
the same qualitative results. Since the intuition is most clearly seen when
disutility of labor depends on age only, we make this assumption in the main
model of this section, and incorporate the role of life expectancy in the disu-
tility of labor function in Section 4.1. For utility of consumption, we start
with a general concave function and obtain unambiguous results about the
impact on retirement age of mortality decline after retirement. However, the
eﬀects of mortality reductions before retirement are ambiguous in general.
To obtain sharper results, we make further assumptions regarding the utility
function, and we do so in two directions: (a) assuming CRRA, as in Heijdra
and Romp [15] and Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17]; and (b) assuming r = ρ, as
in Hazan [13] and Bloom et al. [4]. In either case, the stronger assumptions
allow us to provide interesting economic interpretations of the results.9
We obtain the individual’s optimal consumption and retirement choices
in two steps. First, conditional on a particular retirement age, we obtain
the optimal consumption path. Deﬁne the optimal consumption at age x,
conditional on retirement age R, as c (x,R). Second, based on the conditional
consumption choices in the ﬁrst step, we obtain the optimal retirement age.
This two-step procedure has also been used in d’Albis and Augeraud-Ve´ron
[1] and Heijdra and Romp [15].
8In Section 4.2, we conduct robustness analysis regarding annuity market imperfection.
9To summarize, our assumptions of the survival function, annuity market and objective
function turn out to be very similar to those in Heijdra and Romp [15] and Bloom et al.
[4].
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In the following analysis, we assume that there exists an age x such that
ρ− r + w
′ (x)
w (x)
≤ 0 (7)
for all x ≥ x, and
e−rxw (x)U ′ (c (0, x))− e−ρxφ (x) > 0 (8)
for all x ≤ x.10 We also assume that
e−rΩw (Ω)U ′ (c (0,Ω))− e−ρΩφ (Ω) < 0. (9)
In Proposition 1, we characterize the optimal consumption path and re-
tirement age. We also show that the interior solution for retirement age,
R∗ ∈ (0,Ω), exists and is unique when (7) to (9) hold.11 The proof of Propo-
sition 1 is given in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. For the life-cycle model given by (1) to (6), the optimal path
of consumption, conditional on retirement age R, is characterized by
U ′ (c (x,R)) = e(ρ−r)xU ′ (c (0, R)) . (10)
Moreover, an interior optimal retirement age (R∗), which is deﬁned by
e−rR
∗
w (R∗)U ′ (c (0, R∗)) = e−ρR
∗
φ (R∗) , (11)
exists and is unique if (7) to (9) are satisﬁed.
Eq. (10) is the (continuous-time version of) Euler equation characterizing
the optimal consumption path. The retirement age decision is determined by
the two terms on the right-hand side of (A5) in Appendix A; the ﬁrst term
is the marginal beneﬁt of delaying the retirement age at age R, the second
term is the marginal cost, and both are discounted back to age 0.12 Equating
the marginal beneﬁt with marginal cost and simplifying gives condition (11).
10Assumption (7), which may be restrictive for younger ages, is reasonable for older ages
(say, for ages above x = 50), since wage proﬁle is usually hump-shaped. Assumption (8) is
reasonable for younger ages below x, since disutility of labor is quite low when compared
with the beneﬁt of working at these ages. Together with assumption (9), they are suﬃcient
for Proposition 1 to hold.
11For a modern economy, corner solutions of retirement age are not very interesting.
12Equivalently, (11) can be expressed as w (R∗)U ′ (c (R∗, R∗)) = φ (R∗). This form has
been used, for example, in Sheshinski [21, chapter 4]. We use (11) because it is more
convenient to present our subsequent results in terms of the initial consumption level
c (0, R∗).
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3 Diﬀerential incentives for early retirement
We now study the diﬀerential incentives for early retirement at diﬀerent
stages of the mortality transition. The use of a general survival function (1)
allows us to consider the derivative of optimal retirement age with respect to
a mortality change “around” an arbitrary age x0 ∈ (0,Ω), holding mortality
rates at other ages unchanged. Speciﬁcally, we use the Volterra derivative
of a functional (see, for example, Ryder and Heal [20, Section 3]) to analyze
the impact of a change in μ (x0). First, using (1), we obtain
−∂l (x)
∂μ (x0)
=
{
0
l (x)
if x < x0
if x ≥ x0 . (12)
Note that we use −∂l(x)
∂μ(x0)
, which corresponds to the eﬀect on survival proba-
bility of a mortality decrease, instead of that of a mortality increase, ∂l(x)
∂μ(x0)
.
Eq. (12) has an intuitive interpretation that a mortality decline at age x0
only increases the survival probability at ages above or equal to x0, but has
no eﬀect on survival probability before that age.
To examine the impact on optimal retirement decision of a change in
mortality rate at age x0, we totally diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to R
∗
and μ (x0) to obtain
13
∂R∗
∂μ (x0)
=
1
σ(c(0,R∗))
1
c(0,R∗)
∂c(0,R∗)
∂μ(x0)[
ρ− r + w′(R∗)
w(R∗) − 1σ(c(0,R∗)) 1c(0,R∗) ∂c(0,R
∗)
∂R
− φ′(R∗)
φ(R∗)
] , (13)
where
σ (c) =
−U ′ (c)
cU ′′ (c)
> 0 (14)
is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution when consumption level is c.
Combining (7), (13) and (14), we have
sign
[ −∂R∗
∂μ (x0)
]
= −sign
[−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
]
, (15)
which means that retirement age and initial consumption move in opposite
directions for the optimal solution. The intuition of (15) can be seen from
(11). When an external shock (such as a mortality change) increases initial
13Note that initial consumption depends on mortality rate at an arbitrary age x0, μ (x0),
directly as well as indirectly through R∗. While one may express this dependence explicitly
as c (0, R∗ (μ (.)) , μ (.)) for the comparative static exercises in this section, we maintain
the form c (0, R∗) in the previous section for simplicity.
9
consumption, the marginal utility of consumption, U ′ (c (0, R∗)), decreases.
Looking at the two terms in (11) from a marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost
perspective, such a mortality change shifts the marginal beneﬁt (of delaying
retirement age) schedule downward, but the marginal cost schedule remains
unchanged. As a result, optimal retirement age decreases.
The impact of mortality decline in this model is given in Proposition 2. In
particular, we obtain unambiguous result concerning the signs of the eﬀects
on the consumption path and retirement age of mortality reductions at ages
after retirement. The proof is given in Appendix B.
Proposition 2. For the life-cycle model given by (1) to (6),
(a) the sign of −∂R
∗
∂μ(x0)
is the same as that of a (x0), and
(b) when x0 ≥ R∗,
−∂c (x,R∗)
∂μ (x0)
< 0 (16)
for all x ∈ (0,Ω), and
−∂R∗
∂μ (x0)
> 0. (17)
The intuition of Proposition 2 (a) is as follows. A mortality decline at
an arbitrary age x0 aﬀects lifetime earning and consumption. The eﬀect on
lifetime earning, given in the right-hand side of (A6), is through changes in
survival probabilities. The eﬀect on lifetime consumption, on the other hand,
is through changes in survival probabilities and in the consumption level; see
the left-hand side of (A6). Since mortality decline at x0 only induces increases
in survival probabilities at all ages above it, the two terms related to changes
in survival probabilities in (A6) turn out to be closely related to the level
of ﬁnancial assets at x0, because of the intertemporal budget constraint at
x0. Combining with an implication of the Euler equation (10) that
−∂c(x,R∗)
∂μ(x0)
must be of the same sign for all x, we can express −∂c(0,R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
in terms of a (x0),
as in (A10). Together with (15), we prove Proposition 2 (a).
Proposition 2 (b) is immediate since a (x0) must be positive for x0 ≥ R∗
to support post-retirement consumption. A further look at the proof of
Proposition 2 (b) provides interesting insights useful for subsequent analysis.
A mortality decline at x0 ≥ R∗ does not aﬀect lifetime earning. Thus, the
two terms related to lifetime consumption, given in the left-hand side of (A6),
have to sum to zero. These two terms represent the eﬀect of consumption
level changes (at unchanged survival probabilities) and survival probability
changes (at unchanged consumption level), respectively. It is easy to see
that the second term, related to survival probability changes, is positive.
This implies that the ﬁrst term, related to consumption level changes, must
be negative. According to (A9), −∂c(x,R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
has the same sign for all x, implying
10
that the new consumption path must be either all above or all below the old
consumption path. If the new consumption path is above the old one, the
ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of (A6) is positive, and it is inconsistent with
the intertemporal budget constraint. Thus, this possibility is excluded, and
we obtain (16) and (17) in Proposition 2 (b).
It is observed from Appendix B that the proof of Proposition 2 (b) de-
pends only on the intertemporal budget constraint and the Euler equation,
and it holds for all functional forms of U(c). This proof works for x0 ≥ R∗
because a mortality decline at a post-retirement age does not aﬀect lifetime
earning. On the other hand, when a mortality decline happens before retire-
ment, it aﬀects lifetime earning, and Proposition 2 (a) shows that the impact
on optimal retirement age depends on the sign of a (x0), or equivalently, the
relative magnitude of
∫ Ω
x0
e−rxl (x) c (x,R∗) dx and
∫ R∗
x0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx. It
is diﬃcult to obtain further results about the sign of −∂R
∗
∂μ(x0)
, and the source of
diﬃculty is that with a general utility function, there is no explicit solution
for the endogenous consumption path c (x,R∗). Fortunately, it is well known
that the consumption path can be solved when (a) the instantaneous utility
function is CRRA, and (b) r = ρ. In the following, we exploit this knowledge
and examine these special cases.
3.1 CRRA utility function
For the ﬁrst special case, we assume that
U (c) =
c1−
1
σ − 1
1− 1
σ
, (18)
where σ > 0 is the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution for the
CRRA utility function. In this case, it can further be shown that the initial
consumption level, conditional on retirement age R, is given by14
c (0, R) = m (0) h (0, R) , (19)
where
h (0, R) =
∫ R
0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx (20)
14When the instantaneous utility function is CRRA, (A1) can be simpliﬁed as
∂c (x,R)
∂x
= σ (r − ρ) c (x,R) . (A1a)
Using (A1a) and (A3), we obtain (19).
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is the individual’s human wealth (i.e., non-ﬁnancial wealth) at age 0 condi-
tional on retirement age R, and
m (0) =
[∫ Ω
0
e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]xl (x) dx
]−1
(21)
is the marginal (and average) propensity to consume with respect to human
wealth at age 0.
According to (19), initial consumption is equal to the product of marginal
propensity to consume and human wealth. Therefore, we can decompose the
impact of mortality change on initial consumption, measured in percent-
age, as the sum of the impact of mortality change, again in percentage, on
marginal propensity to consume and on human wealth according to
1
c (0, R∗)
(−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
)
=
1
m (0)
(−∂m (0)
∂μ (x0)
)
+
1
h (0, R∗)
(−∂h (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
)
= −
∫ Ω
x0
e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]xl (x) dx∫ Ω
0
e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]xl (x) dx
+
1
h (0, R∗)
(−∂h (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
)
. (22)
Note that 1
m(0)
(
−∂m(0)
∂μ(x0)
)
does not depend on R∗, and (12) and (21) have been
used in the second equality of (22).
A mortality decline leads to a higher expected number of years to live.
This translates into more years to consume, and thus the marginal propensity
to consume is reduced. This eﬀect, which is always negative, is represented
by the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of (22), and we will refer it as the
“years-to-consume” eﬀect. Initial consumption will be reduced if lifetime
human wealth remains unchanged. A mortality decline, however, generally
increases the expected lifetime human wealth. This eﬀect, which is non-
negative, is represented by the second term on the right-hand side of (22),
and we refer to it as the “lifetime human wealth” eﬀect.
We now apply this decomposition to the life-cycle model with the CRRA
utility function. Obviously, Proposition 2 is applicable for this special case.
In particular, a mortality decline at an age x0 ≥ R∗ leads to a delay in
retirement age. For the CRRA utility function, our decomposition provides
an additional interpretation of the result in Preposition 2 (b). A mortality
decline at a post-retirement age does not aﬀect lifetime human wealth (i.e.,
the second term on the right-hand side of (22) becomes zero). As a result,
there is only a years-to-consume eﬀect for this mortality change. This leads
to a negative eﬀect on initial consumption and thus, through (15), a delay
in optimal retirement age.
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The analysis for a mortality decline occurring at an age before retirement
is more complicated. In this case, there is a negative lifetime human wealth
eﬀect and a positive years-to-consume eﬀect on initial consumption. The
overall result is generally ambiguous, and (15) and (22) imply that the sign
of −∂R
∗
∂μ(x0)
is the same as that of
f (x0) ≡
∫ Ω
x0
e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]xl (x) dx∫ Ω
0
e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]xl (x) dx
−
∫ R∗
x0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx∫ R∗
0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx
. (23)
Eq. (23) indicates that, when a mortality decline occurs at such an age
that there is a substantial increase in expected lifetime human wealth, the
lifetime human wealth eﬀect dominates the years-to-consume eﬀect, leading
to an increase in initial consumption. The substantial increase in lifetime
resources leads to an increase in optimal consumption initially, resulting in
earlier retirement according to (15).
The analysis up to this point only indicates that a mortality decline at a
younger age leading to an earlier retirement age is a possibility when the life-
time human wealth eﬀect dominates the years-to-consume eﬀect. This condi-
tion is consistent with a negative ﬁnancial asset level according to Proposition
2 (a), which holds for a general concave utility function. With the CRRA
utility function, however, the above decomposition allows us to ﬁnd suﬃ-
cient conditions under which sharper results are obtained. They are stated
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. In the life-cycle model with the CRRA utility function, if
w (0) <
∫ R∗
0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx∫ Ω
0
e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]xl (x) dx
= c (0, R∗) , (24)
and
w′ (x)
w (x)
is a monotonic function of x for all x ∈ (0, R∗) , (25)
then there exists a critical age xc within the open interval (0, R
∗) such that
(a) −∂c(x,R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
> 0 for all x ∈ (0,Ω) and −∂R∗
∂μ(x0)
< 0 for all x0 ∈ (0, xc),
(b) −∂c(x,R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
= 0 for all x ∈ (0,Ω) and −∂R∗
∂μ(x0)
= 0 when x0 = xc, and
(c) −∂c(x,R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
< 0 for all x ∈ (0,Ω) and −∂R∗
∂μ(x0)
> 0 for all x0 ∈ (xc, R∗).
Proposition 3 can be understood by comparing the relative magnitude of
the lifetime human wealth and years-to-consume eﬀects. In Fig. 2, we provide
numerical analysis to examine each of these eﬀects as a function of x0, the
age at which there is a mortality decline. These calculations are based on the
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commonly-used parameter values of r = 0.05, ρ = 0.02 and σ = 0.5. The age-
speciﬁc mortality rates are the average taken from the 1990 to 1999 cohorts of
US men from the Berkeley Mortality Database. The wage proﬁle data, taken
from the Current Population Survey (http://cps.ipums.org/cps/), are based
on the average labor income for US men who are in the labor force from 1990
to 1999.15 It can be seen from (23) that each of the terms on the right-hand
side of (23) is downward sloping, with the ﬁrst term (the years-to-consume
eﬀect) decreasing from 1 at the beginning age to some value between 0 and
1 at age R∗ (point A in Fig. 2) and then to 0 at age Ω, and the second
term (the lifetime human wealth eﬀect) decreasing from 1 at the beginning
age to 0 at age R∗, thereafter remaining at 0. According to the proof of
Proposition 3, given in Appendix C, if the initial level of wage income, w (0),
is suﬃciently low such that (24) holds, then there exists an interval within
which a mortality decline at a particular age will lead to earlier retirement.
Moreover, if the wage proﬁle is such that the initial wage level satisﬁes (24)
and its growth rate satisﬁes the monotonicity properties (25), then there
exists a threshold age xc after which the years-to-consume eﬀect dominates
the lifetime human wealth eﬀect.16 As a result, a mortality decline after the
threshold age leads to a higher optimal retirement age. On the other hand, a
mortality decline before the threshold age leads to earlier retirement because
the lifetime human wealth eﬀect dominates the years-to-consume eﬀect.
[Insert Fig. 2 here.]
3.2 When interest and discount rates are equal
For the second special case, we assume that
r = ρ. (26)
From (5), (10) and (26), it can be seen that c (x,R) is independent of age.
Because of this property, we can solve c (0, R) in a form similar to (19), such
that h (0, R) is given by (20) and
m (0) =
[∫ Ω
0
e−rxl (x) dx
]−1
. (21a)
15We have performed a robustness check and obtained similar results when, for example,
the survival and wage data are from 1980 to 1989.
16Note that assumption (24) implies that the individual is in debt at young ages. It is
easy to see that either a constant or exponential wage proﬁle satisﬁes the monotonicity
(of growth rate) assumption (25). An empirically more relevant hump-shaped wage proﬁle
(where w′′ (x) ≤ 0 in the relevant region with a strictly negative value for some x) also
satisﬁes (25), because ddx
[
w′(x)
w(x)
]
=
w′′(x)w(x)−[w′(x)]2
[w(x)]2
≤ 0.
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Following an analysis similar to that for the CRRA utility function, it
can be shown that17
Proposition 4. In the life-cycle model with r = ρ, if
w (0) <
∫ R∗
0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx∫ Ω
0
e−rxl (x) dx
(24a)
and (25) hold, then there exists a critical age xc∈ (0, R∗) such that
(a) −∂c(x,R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
> 0 for all x ∈ (0,Ω) and −∂R∗
∂μ(x0)
< 0 for all x0 ∈ (0, xc),
(b) −∂c(x,R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
= 0 for all x ∈ (0,Ω) and −∂R∗
∂μ(x0)
= 0 when x0 = xc, and
(c) −∂c(x,R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
< 0 for all x ∈ (0,Ω) and −∂R∗
∂μ(x0)
> 0 for all x0 ∈ (xc, R∗).
As for the CRRA utility function, the impact of mortality decline on re-
tirement age for this special case can be decomposed into the lifetime human
wealth and years-to-consume eﬀects.
3.3 Comparisons with Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17]
The result that a mortality decline (at some young ages before retirement)
may lead to an earlier retirement age is quite counterintuitive, and has not
been emphasized much in the literature. One exception is Kalemli-Ozcan and
Weil [17], who argue that, when mortality is high, people who plan to save
for retirement have a high risk of dying young and wasting their savings.18
As a result, the optimal plan is to work until a very old age or even until
death. On the other hand, when mortality is low and the uncertainty of
death is reduced, people may become more willing to plan, and save for, a
longer retirement period.
Despite some similarities in the results, our analysis diﬀers signiﬁcantly
from theirs in three major aspects. First, as discussed in Section 2, Kalemli-
Ozcan andWeil [17] assume no annuities but we assume that perfect annuities
exist. Second, these two articles decompose the eﬀect of mortality decline on
17It is easy to see that when r = ρ, (21) becomes (21a), and (24) becomes (24a). As a
result, the proof of Proposition 4 is essentially the same as that of Proposition 3.
18Chang [7] also suggests that early retirement may result when there is a mortality
decline if the individual saves in old age or if the annuity market is imperfect. However, he
obtains the results in either a deterministic model or a model in which lifetime uncertainty
is captured by an age-invariant mortality process. It is rather unrealistic to assume either
no lifetime uncertainty or age-invariant mortality rates, and we, as well as Kalemli-Ozcan
andWeil [17], use a model with lifetime uncertainty captured by a general survival function.
Heijdra and Romp [15] also show that a mortality decline may lead to early retirement
in an open-economy overlapping-generations model. However, they do not emphasize this
possibility, but rather point out that, for realistic scenarios, a mortality decline will lead
to a delay in retirement.
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retirement age in diﬀerent ways. Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17] use a model
with rectangular survival (as well as a model with exponential survival and
perfect annuity market) to show that a mortality decline leads to a delay
in retirement, an outcome they call the “horizon eﬀect”, which is similar
to the years-to-consume eﬀect discussed above. They then use models with
more general mortality processes and no annuities, and identify the eﬀect of
a mortality decline on retirement age as the sum of the horizon eﬀect and
what they call the “uncertainty eﬀect”. On the other hand, we emphasize the
lifetime human wealth eﬀect instead of the uncertainty eﬀect. Third, they
analyze simultaneous mortality changes at all ages, but we analyze the eﬀect
of mortality decline at an arbitrary age, holding mortality rates at other ages
unchanged.
The diﬀerences in features between Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17] and this
article can be traced to the fact that these two articles emphasize diﬀerent
aspects of mortality decline. Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17] focus on a decrease
in the uncertainty about the age at death, whereas we focus on the aging of
mortality decline. They examine the impact of mortality reductions at all
ages, since a decrease in the variability of age at death is more meaningful
when one considers mortality reductions at all ages. Moreover, they show
that mortality decline may lead to early retirement if the uncertainty eﬀect is
very strong. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the lifetime human wealth eﬀect
is important for the aging of mortality decline channel. We examine mortality
decline at an arbitrary age (instead of a mortality decline process consisting
of mortality changes at all ages) to highlight that mortality reductions at
diﬀerent ages have systematically diﬀerent eﬀects on lifetime human wealth,
and thus on retirement age.
Both the decrease in the variability of age at death and the aging of mor-
tality decline are associated with the mortality transition; see, for example,
Wilmoth and Horiuchi [23, Fig. 1].19 Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17] and this
article are complementary, since their work focuses on one aspect of mortal-
ity decline and we focus on the other, and both show that mortality decline
may lead to early retirement.
4 Extension
In Section 3, we obtain the systematic diﬀerence between the eﬀects on re-
tirement age of a mortality decline at younger and older ages in a life-cycle
19Interestingly, Figs. 1 and 2 in Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17] are similar to Figs. 1b and
1c of Wilmoth and Horiuchi [23], and the two panels in Fig. 1 of this article are similar
to Figs. 1a and 1c of Wilmoth and Horiuchi [23].
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model with the most essential features. The roles of some features of this ba-
sic model are as follows. By assuming a perfect annuity market, the survival
probability l (R) has the same eﬀect on the marginal beneﬁt and marginal
cost of delaying retirement, as seen in (11) or (A5). By assuming that disu-
tility of labor depends only on age and not on life expectancy, a mortality
change shifts the marginal beneﬁt schedule of delaying retirement, but not
the marginal cost schedule. These assumptions enable us to obtain the sharp
results in Section 3 and to provide intuitive interpretation.
We now demonstrate that the results in the previous section continue to
hold when various assumptions are relaxed. Speciﬁcally, we consider: (a)
a dependence of disutility of labor on both current age and life expectancy,
which aﬀects the marginal cost of delaying retirement; and (b) the possibility
of imperfect annuities, which aﬀects the marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost
of delaying retirement diﬀerently.20
4.1 Allowing for compression of morbidity
One feature associated with the phenomenon of mortality decline is that,
besides living longer, individuals also tend to remain healthy for a longer du-
ration, as demonstrated by the average sixty-year-old today, who is healthier
than a typical sixty-year-old a century ago. To capture this phenomenon,
Bloom et al. [3] assume that both health status and disutility of labor de-
pend on age relative to life expectancy. They argue that this assumption
is consistent with the hypothesis of compression of morbidity, in which the
relative, or even absolute, length of time spent in chronic ill-health toward
the end of life declines when life expectancy increases (Bloom et al. [3, p.
94]). We follow their logic in this sub-section, but allow for a slightly more
general speciﬁcation in which disutility of labor depends on age positively
and on life expectancy negatively.
In this case, the objective function (2) is replaced by∫ Ω
0
e−ρxl (x)U (c (x)) dx−
∫ R
0
e−ρxl (x)φ (x, ε (x)) dx, (27)
where
ε (x) =
∫ Ω
x
l (q) dq
l (x)
(28)
20We have also considered the presence of a social security system and found that our
results continue to hold in such an environment. These analyses are not presented here,
but are available to interested readers upon request.
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is life expectancy at age x, and φ′1 (x, ε (x)) > 0 and φ
′
2 (x, ε (x)) < 0 are the
partial derivatives of the disutility function φ (x, ε (x)) with respect to age
and life expectancy, respectively. There is no change in the budget constraint
(3). It can be shown that the optimal retirement age is characterized by
e−rR
∗
w (R∗)U ′ (c (0, R∗)) = e−ρR
∗
φ (R∗, ε (R∗)) . (29)
The ﬁrst-order condition (29) is similar to (11), except that disutility of labor
now depends on life expectancy as well.
Because a mortality change can aﬀect life expectancy according to (28),
we can use (1) and (28) to obtain
−∂ε (x)
∂μ (x0)
=
{
ε(x0)l(x0)
l(x)
0
if x < x0
if x ≥ x0 . (30)
Note that life expectancy at a particular age is the expectation of further
years of life beyond that age. Therefore, a mortality decline at x0 only
aﬀects life expectancy before that age, but has no eﬀect on life expectancy
at an age above or equal to x0.
It can be shown from (29) and (30) that
sign
[ −∂R∗
∂μ (x0)
]
= −sign
[−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
]
(31)
for x0 ≤ R∗, and
sign
[ −∂R∗
∂μ (x0)
]
= −sign
[
1
c (0, R∗)
(−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
)
+ σ (c (0, R∗))
φ′2 (R
∗, ε (R∗))
φ (R∗, ε (R∗))
ε (x0) l (x0)
l (R∗)
]
> 0 (32)
for x0 > R
∗.
A mortality decline at an age ≤ R∗ will have no eﬀect on life expectancy
at R∗, according to (30). As a result, (31) states that there is no change in
the marginal cost schedule, as in the analysis of Section 3. It is clear that
the results in that section continue to hold when disutility of labor depends
also on life expectancy.
When x0 > R
∗, both 1
c(0,R∗)
(
−∂c(0,R∗)
∂μ(x0)
)
and σ (c (0, R∗)) φ
′
2(R
∗,ε(R∗))
φ(R∗,ε(R∗))
ε(x0)l(x0)
l(R∗)
in (32) are negative, and their eﬀects on the marginal beneﬁt and marginal
cost schedules of delaying retirement are as follows. Since a mortality decline
after retirement does not aﬀect lifetime earning, a higher consumption path
is inconsistent with the (unchanged) budget constraint. Therefore, c (0, R∗)
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decreases and the marginal utility of consumption increases, leading to an
upward shift of the marginal beneﬁt (of delaying retirement) schedule. Thus,
the ﬁrst term is negative, and the intuition is the same as in Section 3. For
the second term, a mortality decline at x0 > R
∗ will aﬀect life expectancy at
the optimal retirement age, ε (R∗), positively. Thus, it aﬀects the marginal
cost of delaying retirement negatively because φ′2 (x, ε (x)) < 0. As a result,
the marginal cost schedule shifts downward. Both eﬀects lead to an increase
in the optimal retirement age.
We conclude that the qualitative results of Section 3 are also applicable
when disutility of labor depends on both age and life expectancy.
4.2 Allowing for imperfect annuities
As mentioned in Section 2, we assume a perfect annuity market so as to
focus on the eﬀect due to the aging of mortality decline. Because the eﬀect
on retirement age of a decrease in the uncertainty about the age at death is
eliminated by perfect annuities (Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17]), the perfect
annuity assumption guarantees that any possible eﬀect obtained in our model
is caused by factors other than the uncertainty eﬀect.
While the perfect annuity market has been a useful theoretical benchmark
in many articles (including Bloom et al. [3, 4], Boucekkine et al. [6] and
Heijdra and Romp [15], which are reviewed in Table I) since Yaari [24], there
are imperfections in actual annuity markets. One may question whether the
results in earlier sections will continue to hold or not in imperfect annuity
markets. We now examine this question by using a tractable speciﬁcation
commonly used in the literature to model annuity market imperfection.21
The objective function of the life-cycle model is not aﬀected by the as-
sumptions of the annuity market, and is given by (2). On the other hand,
the budget constraint (3) becomes
a′ (x) =
{
[r + θμ (x)] a (x) + w (x)− c (x)
[r + θμ (x)] a (x)− c (x)
if x ≤ R
if x > R
, (33)
where θ (0 < θ ≤ 1) measures the degree of imperfection of the annuity
market. Hu [16] and Heijdra and Mierau [14] assume that all assets have the
21Diﬀerent reasons such as adverse selection and bequest motive have been suggested
to explain why many people purchase zero or only a small amount of annuities. Providing
detailed analysis regarding diﬀerent sources of annuity market imperfection, while inter-
esting, would be a distraction from this article’s primary objective. We simply follow the
approach used by Hu [16], Hansen and I˙mrohorog˘lu [12] and Heijdra and Mierau [14] to
capture the “mis-pricing” of annuities in an imperfect market. This speciﬁcation allows
us to use the methods in earlier sections and extend the economic intuitions there.
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same rate of return, which is a weighted average of the rate of return with
no annuities and that with perfect annuities. On the other hand, Hansen
and I˙mrohorog˘lu [12] assume that a fraction of assets is annuitized with a
higher rate of return and the remaining fraction is not. Either interpretation
is consistent with (33). The annuity market is perfect when θ = 1, and
imperfect when θ < 1.
It can be shown that the optimal retirement age is characterized by
e−rR
∗
l (R∗)−(1−θ)w (R∗)U ′ (c (0, R∗)) = e−ρR
∗
φ (R∗) . (34)
The eﬀect of annuity market imperfection is reﬂected in the term l (R∗)−(1−θ)
in (34). The reason for its presence is as follows. When deciding whether
to delay retirement or not, the beneﬁt is the marginal utility of the labor
income earned, which is discounted back to age 0. Since the rate of re-
turn of holding ﬁnancial assets at age x is r + θμ (x) , the discount factor
is given by e−
∫R∗
0 [r+θμ(x)]dx = e−rR
∗
l (R∗)θ, and thus the marginal beneﬁt is
e−rR
∗
l (R∗)θ w (R∗)U ′ (c (0, R∗)). The term l (R∗) is also present in the cost
side (through the disutility of labor), as seen in (A5). After cancellation of
terms, l (R∗)−(1−θ) appears on the left-hand side of (34). In the limiting case
of perfect annuities (θ = 1), the two eﬀects related to the survival probability
at R∗ cancel out exactly. To summarize, relative to perfect annuities, market
imperfection reduces the rate of return of accumulating ﬁnancial assets. As
a result, the importance of the survival probability at R∗ on the marginal
beneﬁt of delaying retirement is less than that on the marginal cost, leading
to a net eﬀect of l (R∗)−(1−θ) on the marginal beneﬁt schedule.
From (34), we obtain
sign
[ −∂R∗
∂μ (x0)
]
= sign
[ −1
σ (c (0, R∗))
1
c (0, R∗)
(−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
)
− (1− θ) 1
l (R∗)
(−∂l (R∗)
∂μ (x0)
)]
.
(35)
Following steps similar to those in Appendix B, it can be shown that when
the annuity market is imperfect,
−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
=
θe−rx0l (x0)
θ a (x0) + (1− θ)
∫ Ω
x0
e−rxl (x)θ
(
−U ′(c(x,R∗))
U ′′(c(x,R∗))
)
dx[
U ′′(c(0,R∗))
U ′(c(0,R∗))
] ∫ Ω
0
e−rxl (x)θ
(
−U ′(c(x,R∗))
U ′′(c(x,R∗))
)
dx
.
(36)
Note that both integrals on the right-hand side of (36) are positive for x0 ∈
(0,Ω), and the denominator on the right-hand side is negative.
A mortality decline after retirement does not aﬀect the survival proba-
bility at age R∗. Therefore, −∂l(R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
= 0 and the sign of −∂R
∗
∂μ(x0)
is opposite to
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that of −∂c(0,R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
, according to (35). Furthermore, we know that a (x0) after
retirement is positive. As a result, we conclude that when x0 > R
∗,
= sign
[ −∂R∗
∂μ (x0)
]
= −sign
[−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
]
> 0. (37)
A mortality decline after retirement also leads to a delay in retirement age
when the annuity market is imperfect.
For a mortality decline before retirement, −∂l(R
∗)
∂μ(x0)
= l (R∗). Thus, (35)
leads to
sign
[ −∂R∗
∂μ (x0)
]
= sign
[
θe−rx0l (x0)
θ a (x0)− (1− θ)
∫ x0
0
e−rxl (x)θ
(−U ′ (c (x,R∗))
U ′′ (c (x,R∗))
)
dx
]
(38)
for x0 ≤ R∗. Since a (x0) may be positive or negative before retirement, a
mortality decline before retirement may or may not lead to earlier retire-
ment. Moreover, the eﬀect of annuity market imperfection on retirement age
can be seen by comparing (38) with Proposition 2 (a). For a perfect annu-
ity market, Proposition 2 (a) indicates that −∂R
∗
∂μ(x0)
is negative if and only if
a (x0) is negative. On the other hand, (38) implies that with annuity market
imperfection, −∂R
∗
∂μ(x0)
may still be negative even if a (x0) is zero or slightly
positive. In this sense, imperfect annuities strengthen the result of earlier
retirement when x0 ≤ R∗. Intuitively, we know from (34) that the annuity
market imperfection reduces the return of holding ﬁnancial assets, leading
to a downward shift of the marginal beneﬁt (of delaying retirement) sched-
ule. Other things being equal, this annuity market imperfection eﬀect tends
to reduce the optimal retirement age when mortality decline occurs before
retirement.
We conclude that when annuities are imperfect according to (33), a mor-
tality decline after retirement always leads to a delay in retirement, but a
mortality decline before retirement may lead to earlier or later retirement.
The results for the basic life-cycle model in Section 3 continue to hold when
there is annuity market imperfection.
5 Conclusion
An important feature of mortality transition is that a mortality decline aﬀects
mainly younger people in its early phase but pertains to older people in the
later phase. Motivated by these stylized facts, we examine the eﬀect on
optimal retirement age of a change in mortality at an arbitrary age.
This article makes two signiﬁcant contributions. First, we show that
a mortality decline at older ages (above the optimal retirement age) will
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always result in a delay in retirement, while a mortality decline at younger
ages may or may not lead to early retirement. The intuition of this result is
as follows. When a mortality decline occurs among older people, the lifetime
human wealth eﬀect is absent and thus the years-to-consume eﬀect always
leads to a delay in retirement. For mortality decline at younger ages, we ﬁnd
that, under some general conditions concerning the wage proﬁle, there is a
threshold age before which the lifetime human wealth eﬀect dominates and
the optimal retirement age decreases when there is a mortality decline. On
the other hand, optimal retirement age increases with a mortality decline
after the threshold age. We show that this systematic diﬀerence is also
present when the model is extended to account for compression of morbidity
and annuity market imperfection.
Our analysis of the eﬀect on retirement age of mortality decline at an ar-
bitrary age is complementary to the study by Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil [17],
who focus on another important feature of mortality transition: the decrease
in the uncertainty about the age at death. Interestingly, both articles show
that a mortality decline may lead to early retirement under some conditions
(the uncertainty eﬀect dominates the horizon eﬀect in their model, and the
lifetime human wealth eﬀect dominates the years-to-consume eﬀect in our
model). The counterintuitive result emphasized in these two articles, which
is obtained under diﬀerent modeling assumptions corresponding to the two
salient aspects of mortality transition, should be given more serious atten-
tion.22
The second contribution of this article is methodological. Existing stud-
ies analyzing the relation between mortality change and retirement age often
use indexes or parameters to represent mortality changes, and consider the
derivative(s) of the optimal retirement age with respect to the mortality
parameter(s). However, such a change in the mortality parameter usually af-
fects the instantaneous mortality rates (and thus the survival probabilities)
at diﬀerent ages. We show that the more fundamental question about the
eﬀect on retirement age of a mortality decline at an arbitrary age can be
addressed by using the Volterra derivative. As mortality changes at diﬀerent
22Since our objective in this article is to isolate the eﬀect of mortality change on re-
tirement age, we analyze this eﬀect in an environment in which other potentially impor-
tant factors, such as wealth of diﬀerent cohorts, remain unchanged. However, we share
Kalemli-Ozcan and Weil’s [17, p. 89] view that while mortality decline is an important
factor aﬀecting average retirement age, it is not the only major factor. One possible future
study might incorporate all relevant factors determining retirement age (such as increases
in wealth due to technological progress, changing social security beneﬁt, and mortality
changes) and examine the relative contributions of these factors at diﬀerent stages of the
mortality transition.
22
ages may also have systematically diﬀerent eﬀects on other important vari-
ables such as growth rate of output per capita (e.g., Boucekkine et al. [6],
Zhang et al. [25]), the analysis in this article leads us to believe that the
use of the Volterra derivative will be helpful in other economic-demographic
studies in the future.
6 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Using standard dynamic optimization methods, it can be shown that
U ′′ (c (x,R))
∂c (x,R)
∂x
= (ρ− r)U ′ (c (x,R)) . (A1)
Since the left-hand side of (A1) equals to ∂U
′(c(x,R))
∂x
, solving (A1) gives (10).
Substitute c (x,R), which is characterized by (10), into (2) to express the
objective function in terms of R only. Denote it by V (R). Diﬀerentiating it
with respect to R, we obtain
V ′ (R) =
∫ Ω
0
e−ρxl (x)U ′ (c (x,R))
∂c (x,R)
∂R
dx− e−ρRl (R)φ (R) . (A2)
Integrating (3) and using (1), (4) and (5), we obtain the intertemporal
budget constraint at age 0 as:∫ Ω
0
e−rxl (x) c (x,R) dx =
∫ R
0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx. (A3)
Diﬀerentiating (A3) with respect to R leads to∫ Ω
0
e−rxl (x)
∂c (x,R)
∂R
dx = e−rRl (R)w (R) . (A4)
Substituting (10) and (A4) into (A2), we obtain
V ′ (R) = e−rRl (R)w (R)U ′ (c (0, R))− e−ρRl (R)φ (R) . (A5)
Setting V ′ (R) to 0 and simplifying, the ﬁrst-order condition for an interior
optimal retirement age is given by (11).
Assumption (8) implies that for x ∈ [0, x], the individual’s marginal ben-
eﬁt of delaying retirement exceeds the marginal cost. Assumption (9) states
that marginal cost of delaying retirement until Ω exceeds marginal beneﬁt.
When (8) and (9) hold, the existence of an interior optimal solution for R∗
23
in the interval (x,Ω) is guaranteed. Also, R∗ does not exist in the interval
[0, x].
When (7) holds, the second order condition of the maximization problem
is satisﬁed, because
V ′′ (R)|R=R∗ =
l (R∗) e−ρR
∗
φ (R∗)
[
ρ− r + w
′ (R∗)
w (R∗)
+
U ′′ (c (0, R∗))
U ′ (c (0, R∗))
∂c (0, R∗)
∂R
− φ
′ (R∗)
φ (R∗)
]
< 0.
Since ∂c(0,R
∗)
∂R
> 0 and φ′ (x) ≥ 0, condition (7) implies that when the net
diﬀerence of marginal beneﬁt and marginal cost equals to zero, this net diﬀer-
ence function is always downward sloping at the interior solution. Therefore,
it eliminates the possibility of multiple solutions that satisfy (11).
7 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
Diﬀerentiating (A3) at R = R∗ with respect to μ (x0), and simplifying, gives23∫ Ω
0
e−rxl (x)
[−∂c (x,R∗)
∂μ (x0)
]
dx+
∫ Ω
0
e−rx
[−∂l (x)
∂μ (x0)
]
c (x,R∗) dx
=
∫ R∗
0
e−rx
[−∂l (x)
∂μ (x0)
]
w (x) dx. (A6)
Similar to (A3), the intertemporal budget constraint at age x0 can be
expressed as
e−rx0l (x0) a (x0) =
{ ∫ Ω
x0
e−rxl (x) c (x,R∗) dx− ∫ R∗
x0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx∫ Ω
x0
e−rxl (x) c (x,R∗) dx
if x0 < R
∗
if x0 ≥ R∗ .
(A7)
Substituting (12) and (A7) into (A6), we obtain∫ Ω
0
e−rxl (x)
[−∂c (x,R∗)
∂μ (x0)
]
dx+ e−rx0l (x0) a (x0) = 0. (A8)
Diﬀerentiating (10) at R = R∗ with respect to μ (x0), and simplifying,
gives
U ′′ (c (x,R∗))
[−∂c (x,R∗)
∂μ (x0)
]
=
U ′ (c (x,R∗))
U ′ (c (0, R∗))
U ′′ (c (0, R∗))
[−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
]
.
(A9)
23Because of (A4), we have
∫ Ω
0 e
−rxl (x) ∂c(x,R
∗)
∂R
∂R∗
∂μ(x0)
dx = e−rR
∗
l (R∗)w (R∗) ∂R
∗
∂μ(x0)
.
We obtain (A6) after these two terms are cancelled out. A similar cancellation of terms
due to the indirect eﬀects through a change in R∗ is also used in (A9) below.
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Substituting (A9) into (A8) gives
−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
=
e−rx0l (x0) a (x0)[
U ′′(c(0,R∗))
U ′(c(0,R∗))
] ∫ Ω
0
e−rxl (x)
(
−U ′(c(x,R∗))
U ′′(c(x,R∗))
)
dx
. (A10)
Combining (5), (15) and (A10), we have
sign
[ −∂R∗
∂μ (x0)
]
= −sign
[−∂c (0, R∗)
∂μ (x0)
]
= sign [a (x0)] .
This proves Proposition 2 (a).
Proposition 2 (b) is immediate from Proposition 2 (a) since a (x0) must
be positive for x0 ∈ [R∗,Ω) at the optimal solution.
8 Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
From (23), we obtain f (0) = 0, f (R∗) > 0,
f ′ (x0) =
−e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]x0l (x0)∫ Ω
0
e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]xl (x) dx
+
e−rx0l (x0)w (x0)∫ R∗
0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx
, (A11)
and
f ′′ (x0) =
[(1− σ) r + σρ+ μ (x0)] e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]x0l (x0)∫ Ω
0
e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]xl (x) dx
−
[
r + μ (x0)− w′(x0)w(x0)
]
e−rx0l (x0)w (x0)∫ R∗
0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx
. (A12)
Therefore, a suﬃcient condition for f (x0) < 0 in some interval within (0, R
∗)
is f ′ (0) < 0. It can be shown from (A11) that f ′ (0) < 0 iﬀ
1∫ Ω
0
e−[(1−σ)r+σρ]xl (x) dx
>
w (0)∫ R∗
0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx
,
which is equivalent to (24). Since f (.) is continuous in [0, R∗], f (0) = 0,
f ′ (0) < 0 and f (R∗) > 0 imply that there exists a critical age xc within
(0, R∗) such that f (xc) = 0 and f (x0) is negative for all x0 < xc.
Moreover, the above properties imply that at least one local extremum
must exist between (0, R∗). At a local extremum (denoted by x˜0, with
f ′ (x˜0) = 0), we can use (A11) and (A12) to obtain
f ′′ (x˜0) =
[
w′(x˜0)
w(x˜0)
− σ (r − ρ)
]
e−rx˜0l (x˜0)w (x˜0)∫ R∗
0
e−rxl (x)w (x) dx
. (A13)
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Arrange the n extrema (where n ≥ 1) in an ascending order as a sequence
{x˜0,i}, i = 1, 2, ..., n. Since (24) implies that the ﬁrst local extremum is a
minimum, this sequence has the property that f ′′ (x˜0,i) > 0 for all i which
are odd and f ′′ (x˜0,i) < 0 for all i which are even. According to (A13), the
sign of f ′′ (x˜0,i) is the same as that of
w′(x˜0)
w(x˜0)
− σ (r − ρ). There are three
distinct cases for (25): (i) d
dx
[
w′(x)
w(x)
]
= 0 for all x, (ii) d
dx
[
w′(x)
w(x)
]
≥ 0 for all
x with a strictly positive value for some x, and (iii) d
dx
[
w′(x)
w(x)
]
≤ 0 for all x
with a strictly negative value for some x. When (24) and either (i) or (ii)
hold, then w
′(x˜0)
w(x˜0)
− σ (r − ρ) is always positive and n must be 1. When (24)
and (iii) hold, then n may be either 1 or 2. (The shape of function f (x0) in
the lower panel of Fig. 2 is based on this case, with n = 2.) In each of the
above cases, there is only one xc such that f (xc) = 0 and f (x0) is positive
for all x0 > xc. This proves Proposition 3.
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Fig. 1. Survival curves and mortality rates (US males).
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Table I 
Comparison of various models analyzing mortality decline and retirement. 
Survival
curve
Annuity
market 
Separability
in
consumption 
and labor (or 
leisure) 
Instantaneous
utility of 
consumption 
function
Instantaneous
disutility of 
labor function 
d’Albis and 
Augeraud-
Véron [1] 
Rectangular / Yes CRRA Independent
of age 
Bloom, 
Canning,
Mansfield and 
Moore [3] 
Exponential Perfect Yes Log Depending on 
age and life 
expectancy 
Bloom, 
Canning and 
Moore [4] 
General Perfect Yes Concave Depending on 
age and life 
expectancy 
Boucekkine, de 
la Croix and
Licandro
(BCL) [6] 
BCL Perfect Yes Linear Depending on 
age
Chang [7] Rectangular
/
Exponential
No annuities 
/
Perfect
annuity
market 
No / /
Hazan [13] Rectangular / Yes Concave Depending on 
age
Heijdra and 
Mierau [14] 
Exponential
/
BCL
Perfect
/
Imperfect  
Yes Log Independent
of age 
Heijdra and 
Romp [15] 
General Perfect Yes CRRA Depending on 
age
Kalemli-Ozcan 
and Weil [17]  
Rectangular
/
Exponential
/
BCL
/
General
No annuities 
/
Perfect
annuity
market 
Yes Log  
/
CRRA
Independent
of age 
